India's mistakes (lesson: dont trust the US)

Mistakes:
1. trusted the US.
2. gave up her self-respect and sucked up to the US. 1 was a necessary (but definitely NEVER sufficient) condition for 2.

Consequences:
US, as expected by anyone who would have the slightest hint of the role US is looking to play in most other nations' futures, lands India in a hole.

Facts:
(From an article in The Hindu by Dr. M.R. Srinivasan - a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)
1. India and US agree on a 'nuclear deal' - July 2005 and March 2006. People are gaga about it without realising the fine points and the probable consequences.

2. "Henry J. Hyde, United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006" deviates, very seriously and with dire consequences for India, from the agreements.
2a. The act contains a provision for the suspension of all cooperation were India to conduct a nuclear test in future. This comes from a country which is stockpiling nuclear weapons and developing new such weapons (e.g. the US is working on the design of a "Reliable Replacement Weapon" (RRW) to modernise its nuclear arsenal. Also, the US has signed but not ratified the CTBT - huh? just another instance of its many hypocrisies.). So, if India starts using imported reactors and imported fuel channeled through this deal, it shall be in no position to ever conduct a nuclear test again - when all and sundry may be doing it.

2b. In the previous agreements, the US insisted on India placing some of its reactors under voluntary "safeguards in perpetuity" in return for nuclear fuel supplies being maintained. It also agreed to work with other nuclear suppliers to enable India to secure nuclear fuel so that its nuclear power stations could continue to operate. The Hyde Act has reneged on this. The Act even calls upon the U.S. administration to work with the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure that India cannot get supplies of nuclear fuel if, for reasons contained in the Act, the U.S. is required to suspend supplies to India.

2c. "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation" was promised to India in July 2005 and India assumed that this term encompassed the fuel cycle, namely enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel. Now, U.S. legislators have argued that the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 specifically forbids export of these technologies, as also heavy water production technology to other countries. (Thankfully, India has developed its own technologies in these three vital areas.) Apparently the US president is ignorant of his country's laws or the Americans have a very different (and twisted) definition of "full".

2d. With regard to the sequencing of actions, the understanding between India and the U.S. was that the approval of the U.S. Congress and removal of restrictions on nuclear trade with India would take place simultaneously with NSG clearance to make exemptions in favour of India and with India placing facilities designated as civilian by India under IAEA safeguards. The present Act requires India to have concluded "all legal steps prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity... "; and also that "India and IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol," among other conditions....In "Definitions," it is clearly stated that the "Additional Protocol" is to be based on the Model Additional protocol of the IAEA applicable to non-nuclear weapon states, which is highly intrusive... and many more conditions.

Another link:http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/16/stories/2006121616171500.htm